Apriority as an Evaluative Notion

Hartry H. Field

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Philosophy, Science, and History

Abstract

Abstract Hartry Field argues that meaning‐based approaches to explaining the apriority of certain propositions fail to succeed in their endeavour. He suggests that adopting what one calls a ‘non‐factualist’ view of justification itself removes the mystery of the apriority of such propositions, and sketches what such a view of justification involves.

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References

1990Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 1979TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS 1984Testing Scientific Theories 1988Strong and Weak Justification 1965The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap 1971Immodest Inductive Methods

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2007Entitlement and rationality 2011Rational self-doubt and the failure of closure 2008How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified?2009Epistemology without metaphysics 2009The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism 2010THE RELIABILITY CHALLENGE AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF LOGIC 2013Immoderately rational 2004Skeptical Arguments

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