Separability vs. Difference. Parts and Capacities of the Soul in Aristotle

Klaus Corcilius · Pavel Gregorić

126 citations0/0 files storedOxford studies in ancient philosophy

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Classical Philosophy and Thought Medieval Philosophy and Theology Medieval and Classical Philosophy

Abstract

According to the standard view, Aristotle makes no difference between a capacity of the soul and a part of the soul. We argue that Aristotle made a clear and methodologically important distinction between parts and capacities, and we explicate Aristotle's criterion for deciding which capacities count as parts of the soul.

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2018Aristotle on the Uses of Contemplation 2019Aristotle on the Definition of What It Is to Be Human 2019Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology 2017Ontological Separation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 2014Activity, Passivity, and Perceptual Discrimination in Aristotle 2019Speech and the Rational Soul 2018Perception in Aristotle's Ethics 2012Aristotle on the Separability of Mind

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