Manipulation

Abstract

Abstract As social creatures, we influence one another in a variety of ways. Much of this influence is benign—for example, advising family and friends, serving as role models for our children and students. Some forms of influence, however, are clearly morally suspect, such as violence, threats of violence, and blackmail. A great deal of attention has been paid to one form of morally suspect influence, namely coercion. Less attention has been paid to what might be a more pervasive form of influence: manipulation. The chapters in this volume address this relative imbalance by focusing on manipulation, examining its nature, moral status, and significance in personal and social life. A number of central questions are addressed: What counts as manipulation? How is it distinguished from coercion and ordinary rational persuasion? Is it always wrong, or can it sometimes be justified—and if so, when? Can one manipulate unintentionally? How does being manipulated to do something bear on one’s moral responsibly for doing it? Given various answers to these questions, what should we think of institutions and practices such as advertising, dating, and seduction? Should policymakers—similar to Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s suggestion in their influential bestseller Nudge—regard broadly manipulative measures as a welcome alternative to coercion?

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