Who Decides, and How? Preferences, Uncertainty, and Policy Choice in the European Parliament

Abstract

Chapter 1 briefly introduces the book's core argument. When MEPs make decisions on issues outside their areas of expertise, they adopt the positions of their expert colleagues in the responsible committee whose preferences over political outcomes they believe most closely match their own. This is based on the assumption that these positions resemble what they would favor if they possessed the resources and expertise necessary to independently evaluate the policy proposal. The critical mechanism explaining policy choice is perceived preference coherence between expert and nonexpert legislators. Common party affiliation serves as a proxy for shared preferences, and therefore party positions are cohesive as long as a unified party line is achieved among party policy experts in committee. This chapter additionally outlines what is to come in the remainder of the book and provides background information on the European Parliament and EP decision-making.

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