Executive compensation and shareholder value : theory and evidence

Jennifer N. Carpenter · David Yermack

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Corporate Finance and Governance Accounting and Organizational Management Corporate Governance and Financial Management

Abstract

Introduction J. Carpenter, D. Yermack. Part I:- 1. Top Executive Incentives in Germany, Japan and the U.S.: A Comparison S.N. Kaplan. 2. Corporate Governance, Executive Pay and Performance in Europe M.J. Conyon, J. Schwalbach. 3. A Better Way to Pay CEOs? B.J. Hall. 4. Discussion: The Winner-Takes-All: An Alternative View of CEO Incentives T.T. Milbourn. Part II:- 5. Dual Agency: Corporate Boards with Reciprocally Interlocking Relationships K.F. Hallock. 6. Discussion A.H. Rosenbloom. Part III:- 7. The Rise and Fall of Executive Share Options in Britain B.G.M. Main. 8. Patterns of Employee Stock Option Exercises in the United States S. Huddart. 9. Discussion S. Matsunaga. 10. Discussion J. Samuels.

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