Modeling Rational Agents: From Interwar Economics to Early Modern Game Theory

Nicola Giocoli

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Game Theory and Applications Economic Theory and Institutions Historical Economic and Legal Thought

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Contents: 1. Introduction: Two Images of Economics 2. The Escape from Psychology 3. The Escape from Perfect Foresight 4. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's Game Theory 5. Nash's Game Theory 6. Conclusion: The Fall and Rise of Modern Game Theory References Index

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