Introduction ‘Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind.’ Taking its cue from this paraphrase of Kant's famous dictum, this paper intends to explain how the historiography of science should learn from the philosophy of science and vice versa . It will be argued that ( a ) philosophy of science provides normative methodologies in terms of which the historian reconstructs ‘internal history’ and thereby provides a rational explanation of the growth of objective knowledge; ( b ) two competing methodologies can be evaluated with the help of (normatively interpreted) history; ( c ) any rational reconstruction of history needs to be supplemented by an empirical (socio-psychological) ‘external history’. The vital demarcation between normative-internal and empiricalexternal is different for each methodology. Jointly, internal and external historiographical theories determine to a very large extent the choice of problems for the historian. But some of external history's most crucial problems can be formulated only in terms of one's methodology; thus internal history, so defined, is primary, and external history only secondary. Indeed, in view of the autonomy of internal (but not of external) history, external history is irrelevant for the understanding of science. Rival methodologies of science; rational reconstructions as guides to history There are several methodologies afloat in contemporary philosophy of science; but they are all very different from what used to be understood by ‘methodology’ in the seventeenth or even eighteenth century.
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