Compensation for Regulatory Takings: An Economic Analysis With Applications

Abstract

Part A: introduction brief overview of Takings law an economic approach to the Takings question a preview of issues and results review of the Case law and literature on Takings Case law academic literature summary. Part B Theoretical analysis: the basic model socially efficient behaviour actual land use decisions pre-existing land uses summary. Landowner versus regulator incentives the regulator's problem the landowner's problem an efficient compensation rule the essential Nexus requirement conclusion appendices to chapter 4 and 5 - a re-examination of Takings doctrines application to previous tests for compensation application to cases conclusion capitalization and Takings description of the model capitalization - distributional issues capitalization - efficiency summary appendix to chapter 6 investment-backed expectations and compensations the simple model a dynamic model summary and conclusion appendix to chapter 7 the timing of development and compensation irreversible development reversible development summary conclusion. Part C Applications to environmental protection and resources - use: applications of historical significance - mining, zoning and historical landmarks mining regulation zoning and the regulation of undeveloped land historic landmarks and Takings new concerns - protection of Wetlands and endangered species wetlands protection on endangered species extension to non-land based resources - water allocation the economics of water allocation legislative regulation of water rights and Takings judicial regulation of water rights and takings conclusion the threshold approach a summary of conclusions some other issues a policy proposal endnotes references list of cases.

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