Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy: Tsongkhapa's Quest for the Middle Way

Abstract

Methodological issues: problems of interpretation in Tsongkhapa studies questions of development and originality in Tsongkhapa's thought textual sources. Contexts of Tsongkhapa's thought: historical contexts of Tsongkhapa's middle view qualms about early Tibetan interpretations of the middle view Tsongkhapa's key religious and philosophical concerns central elements of Tsongkhapa's philosophical method. Delineating reason's scope for negation: Tsongkhapa's reading of Madhyamaka's tetralemma logic discerning the domains of and ultimate discourses identifying the object of negation in Madhyamaka dialectics logical analysis of the forms of negation the primacy of the reductio and absurdam method. Tsongkhapa's deconstruction of the self: levels of self-hood according Tsongkhapa inadequacies of the Buddhist reductionist theory of no-self the concept of intrinsic being negation of intrinsic being as no-self. Personal identity, continuity and I-consciousness: personal identity and dependent origination the nature of I-consciousness individuality and continuity the chariot analogy. No-self, truth and the middle way: to exist is exist on the conventional level everyday reality as fiction-like beyond absolutism, nihilism and relativism no-self, reason and soeriology.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 68 citations exist upstream.