Shamanism and the Confusion of Consciousness with Phenomenological Content

Abstract

The phenomenology of shamanism has been the focus of much contemporary psychological interest. However, it is arguable that the concept of "shamanic states of consciousness" is neither well defined nor sufficiently understood. We critically examine the term "shamanic states of consciousness" and argue that affixing the qualifier "shamanic states" to consciousness results in a theoretical confusion of consciousness and its content, that is, consciousness is mistaken for the content of consciousness. We refer to this fallacy as the "consciousness/content fallacy." We argue that this fallacy is avoided if one replaces "shamanic states of consciousness" with "shamanic patterns of phenomenal properties," an extrapolation of the term "phenomenal field." Implications of the consciousness/content fallacy for "states of consciousness" studies are also considered.

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