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CONDORCET'S PARADOX AND THE CONDORCET EFFICIENCY OF VOTING RULES. · Study

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ArticleCONDORCET'S PARADOX AND THE CONDORCET EFFICIENCY OF VOTING RULES.

V Gehrlein William1997

Article1997

CONDORCET'S PARADOX AND THE CONDORCET EFFICIENCY OF VOTING RULES.

V Gehrlein William

81 citations·0/0 files stored·Mathematica japonica

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence

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2007Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis 2002Chapter 1 Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework 2006PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS UNDER THE IAC HYPOTHESIS

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Year1997

Typearticle

Published1997-01-01

VenueMathematica japonica

ISSN-L0025-5513

Languageen

Citations81

Files0 public / 0

ShelfGame Theory and Voting Systems

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openalex_workW645616100

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