Disjunctivism and Skepticism

Alan Millar

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

Abstract This article considers the epistemological significance of disjunctivism and its bearing on philosophical skepticism. It explains that disjunctivism is a way of thinking about perceptual experience and perceptual knowledge and it is also the view that judgments that characterize how experience appears to a subject is as if things have disjunctive truth conditions. It discusses the relation of disjunctivism with the tradition of the conception of experience and the concept of recognitional abilities.

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References

2000Knowledge and Its Limits 1986Philosophical explanations 1961The Causal Theory of Perception 2001Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge 1995Knowledge and the Internal 2006Perceptual Experience 2002(Anti‐)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E. Moore and John McDowell*1981Meaning and Understanding

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2010Epistemic Internalism

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