Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons

Abstract

This chapter explores the possibility that some minimal right to immunity from uninvited observation and reporting is required by certain basic features of our conception of a person. It deals, therefore, with a cluster of immunities which, if acknowledged, curb the freedom of others to do things that are generally quite innocent if done to objects other than persons, and even to persons, if done with their permission. The chapter suggests that a general principle of privacy might be grounded on the more general principle of respect for persons. For the principle itself is not limited in its application; it constitutes a prima facie claim in respect to anything a man does. To claim immunity on the ground that an inquiry is an intrusion into one's private affairs is to make an argumentative move of a quite different kind. The activities and experiences commonly thought to fall within this special private area are diverse and largely culture- dependent.

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