Implications of Methodological Approaches in Decision Theory: A Conceptual Synthesis with Emphasis on Heuristics

Abstract

Distinct theoretical frameworks have contributed to the development of Decision Theory, each offering specific insights into how decision-making occurs. This article aims to examine how methodological approaches across major frameworks in descriptive Decision Theory shape distinct perspectives on heuristics, intuition, and emotion, but with distinguished emphasis on heuristics. Methodologically, the study develops a conceptual synthesis that describes the core concepts of each framework and compares their methodological approaches and theoretical perspectives. The analysis begins with Bounded Rationality, as proposed by Herbert Simon, and then examines the Heuristics and Biases framework developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Naturalistic Decision Making proposed by Gary Klein, Ecological Rationality associated with Gerd Gigerenzer, and Neuroeconomics advanced by Colin Camerer. The findings indicate that methodological approaches are not merely technical tools, but epistemic lenses that shape how cognitive mechanisms are identified, interpreted, and evaluated. Rather than reflecting purely theoretical disagreements, contrasting views on heuristics emerge from systematically different ways of observing and modeling decision processes. This article contributes to the literature by clarifying how methodological approaches shape theoretical perspectives in Decision Theory and by showing that different classes of heuristics (task-specific, general, and domain-specific) are associated with optimistic, skeptical, or more pragmatic views about the role and applicability of these mechanisms in decision-making.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 0 citations exist upstream.