“A Matter of Chance”: An Epistemological Interpretation of Chance in Radical Behaviorism

Abstract

Abstract The concept of chance cited by B. F. Skinner was not subject to a detailed examination to elucidate changes in his explanatory system. This article explains and discusses the meanings of chance identified in the author’s texts. Skinner approached it in two different ways. First, is taken to be incompatible with the process of producing scientific knowledge, as it is characterized as antagonistic to achieving the desiderata of behavioral science (laws, prediction, and control). In the second, chance is compatible with Skinnerian science when the concept is inserted in the explanation of the evolution of behavior in terms of variation and selection. The results endorse epistemological shifts towards selectionistic and indeterministic conceptions of science in Skinner.

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