Termos psicológicos disposicionais e análise do comportamento

Abstract

The main goal of this article is to present a logic-conceptual reconstruction and evaluation of three of Skinner’s arguments for the thesis that ordinary psychological terms are, in general, inadmissible in behavior analysis (the inadmissibility thesis). We begin by providing a review of Skinner’s account of such terms, particularly his approach to the categories of dispositional psychological terms. Much of it is here accepted, but adopting as a hypothesis a disagreement with Skinner’s premise that they are irremediably mentalistic. Our analysis shows that, if this hypothesis is correct, then his arguments for the inadmissibility thesis do not turn out to be entirely plausible; and also, that, though Skinner’s option is plainly acceptable, so is an (in principle) alternative approach, which explores, in behavior analysis, the heuristic value of such terms (without embodying them into the basic vocabulary) for the discovery of behavioral patterns and contexts in open research environments. A collateral goal of this article is to unmask as misguided two frequent assumptions in philosophy of mind concerning radical behaviorism; namely, that it does not have a relevant approach to the operations of mental terms, and that its inadmissibility thesis is based upon verificationist premises.

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