Mindreading by simulation: The roles of imagination and mirroring

Abstract

There is consensus in cognitive science that ordinary people are robust mindreaders and that mindreading begins early in life. Many other questions concerning mindreading, however, remain in dispute, including the four that follow: (1) By what method(s) do cognizers read other people’s minds-- that is, attribute mental states to them? Which cognitive capacities, mechanisms, or processes play pivotal roles in mindreading? 1 Call this the task-execution question. (2) How did the human species, and how do individuals, acquire mindreading capacities? What are the phylogenetic and ontogenetic parts of the story? Call this the acquisition question. (3) What neural substrates underlie mindreading? In other words, does the proposed story pass neuroscientific muster? Call this the neural plausibility question. (4) How does the proffered story of mindreading mesh with the general story of human cognition? Is mindreading a typical example of cognition, or is it a singularity-- a one-off piece of cognitive hardware? Call this the question of mesh. 1

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