Why Explanations Lie: Idealization in Explanation

Abstract

On the causal approach to explanation, explaining a phenomenon is telling the actual causal story as to why it occurs. Science is full of idealizing explanations that deliberately falsify the relevant causal story. Therefore, either (a) the causal approach to explanation is mistaken, or (b) idealizing explanations, however convenient, are deeply flawed. Correct? I don’t think so. I show that on an enlightened causal account of explanation, idealization is not merely tolerable; done right, it enhances the explanatory power of a causal model. This paper is based on chapter 8 of Strevens (forthcoming).

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