The Consequentialist Perspective

Abstract

This chapter is an attempt to provide a fair overview of consequentialism and its alternatives and to show why the consequentialist perspective is both attractive and compelling. First, it presents a number of assumptions in moral psychology that ought to be agreed among consequentialists and non-consequentialists alike; it is important to begin with these, because consequentialism is often mistakenly criticized for not recognizing one or other of them. Third, the chapter outlines the different sorts of approaches, consequentialist and non-consequentialist, that may be taken to the question of Tightness. And then in the fourth section, it presents the case for the consequentialist answer: for the answer, roughly, that the right option in any choice is that which produces the goods, that which promotes expected, neutral value. Finally, the chapter considers the tenability of that answer in face of standard objections to consequentialism, arguing that it represents a challenging but still intuitive understanding of ethical demands.

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