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Truth and Realism
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Truth and Realism (2006)Truth and RealismWhy formal objections to the error theory fail (2020)Why formal objections to the …De-idealizing Disagreement, Rethinking Relativism (2017)De-idealizing Disagreement, R…Absolutely tasty: an examination of predicates of personal taste and faultless disagreement (2017)Absolutely tasty: an examinat…Expressivism, Attitudinal Complexity and Two Senses of Disagreement in Attitude (2015)Expressivism, Attitudinal Com…Disagreement about Taste and Alethic Suberogation (2015)Disagreement about Taste and …Faultless disagreement, cognitive command, and epistemic peers (2014)Faultless disagreement, cogni…Motivations for Relativism as a Solution to Disagreements (2013)Motivations for Relativism as…Disagreement Without Error (2013)Disagreement Without ErrorWhat Intuitions Are Like1 (2011)What Intuitions Are Like1A companion to relativism (2011)A companion to relativismResurrecting Biological Essentialism (2009)Resurrecting Biological Essen…Putting Metaphysics First (2009)Putting Metaphysics FirstPhilosophy: A Contribution, not to Human Knowledge, but to Human Understanding (2009)Philosophy: A Contribution, n…In defence of error theory (2009)In defence of error theoryReplies to Wright, MacFarlane and Sosa (2008)Replies to Wright, MacFarlane…OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIONAL GOOD (2007)OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIONAL GO…Intentionality (1983)Studies in the Way of Words (1989)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)How philosophers use intuition and ‘intuition’ (2014)The Epistemic Unity of Perception (2015)The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding (2015)Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)Ruling Passions (1998)Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste* (2005)Disagreement Lost and Found (2017)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)11. Reasons and Persons (1986)On the Plurality of Worlds (1986)Adventures in the metaontology of art: local descriptivism, artefacts and dreamcatchers (2012)Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value (2012)Reasons, inescapability and persuasion (2016)Naming and Necessity (1972)TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS (1979)The Philosophy of Philosophy (2007)Understanding philosophy (2022)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)RELATIONAL GOOD AND THE MULTIPLICITY PROBLEM1 (2009)The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended (2012)Pluralism about Well‐Being (2014)The Moral Problem (1994)Oxford: Oxford University (2005)Truth and Objectivity (1992)The Nature of Normativity (2007)THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1963)Reason, Truth and History (1981)Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (1986)What Can We Do, When We Do Metaphysics? (2017)Moore against the New Skeptics (2019)Representation of Language (2020)The development of epistemological understanding (2000)Insensitive Semantics (2005)Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1976)Ways of Worldmaking (1978)The Evolving Notion and Role of Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis (2015)
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  • 2007OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIONAL GOOD80 cited
  • 2011What Intuitions Are Like179 cited
  • 2009Putting Metaphysics First78 cited
  • 2009In defence of error theory61 cited
  • 2013Disagreement Without Error60 cited
  • 2015Expressivism, Attitudinal Complexity and Two Senses of Disagreement in Attitude46 cited
  • 2009Philosophy: A Contribution, not to Human Knowledge, but to Human Understanding43 cited
  • 2011A companion to relativism40 cited
  • 2017Absolutely tasty: an examination of predicates of personal taste and faultless disagreement38 cited
  • 2015Disagreement about Taste and Alethic Suberogation36 cited
  • 2017De-idealizing Disagreement, Rethinking Relativism36 cited
  • 2009Resurrecting Biological Essentialism31 cited
  • 2008Replies to Wright, MacFarlane and Sosa31 cited
  • 2014Faultless disagreement, cognitive command, and epistemic peers29 cited
  • 2020Why formal objections to the error theory fail28 cited
  • 2013Motivations for Relativism as a Solution to Disagreements

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27 cited