SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Some results on incentive contracts with applications to education and employment, health insurance, and law enforcement.
9 references·16 citing·42 second hop
Some results on incentive contracts with applications to education and employment, health insurance, and law enforcement. (1978)Some results on incentive contracts with …Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information (1979)Optimal incentive contracts w…Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…Incentives, Risk , and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy (1975)Incentives, Risk , and Inform…Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers (1974)Law Enforcement, Malfeasance,…Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution (1974)Competitive and optimal respo…The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)The Economic Theory of Agency…Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Essays in the Theory of Risk-…Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives (1970)Medical insurance: A case stu…The Economics of Moral Hazard (1969)The Economics of Moral HazardDoes Corporate Governance Affect the Quality of Integrated Reporting? (2020)Does Corporate Governance Aff…Management Risk Incentives and the Readability of Corporate Disclosures (2017)Management Risk Incentives an…Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights (2015)Optimal Sales Contracts with …Empirical evidence on the operational efficiency of National Oil Companies (2010)Empirical evidence on the ope…Top management incentive compensation and knowledge sharing in multinational corporations (2008)Top management incentive comp…Effort, Performance, and Conscientiousness: An Agency Theory Perspective (2007)Effort, Performance, and Cons…A reexamination of agency theory assumptions: extensions and extrapolations (2001)A reexamination of agency the…Optimal Insurance under Moral Hazard (2000)Optimal Insurance under Moral…Optimism Biases among Brokerage and Non-Brokerage Firms' Equity Recommendations: Agency Costs in the Investment Industry (1998)Optimism Biases among Brokera…The Interaction between Forms of Insurance Contract and Types of Technical Change in Medical Care (1991)The Interaction between Forms…Salesforce Compensation: Theory and Managerial Implications (1989)Salesforce Compensation: Theo…Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard (1987)Optimal Enforcement Strategy …Redirecting research in business policy and strategy (1985)Redirecting research in busin…The Interdependence of Individual Portfolio Decisions and the Demand for Insurance (1983)The Interdependence of Indivi…Optimal Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules (1983)Optimal Insurance Policy Inde…Employment With Asymmetric Information (1983)Employment With Asymmetric In…Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty. (1969)Agency for International Development (1978)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)The Demand for Insurance With an Upper Limit on Coverage (2004)Optimal Reinsurance Arrangements Under Tail Risk Measures (2009)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)The Theory of Economic Regulation (2021)Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1966)The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance (1973)The Rational Nonpurchase of Long-Term-Care Insurance (1990)Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection (1996)UNCERTAINTY AND THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE (2003)The Economics of Welfare (1933)Higher education as a filter (1973)Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets (1986)The function of authority in transaction cost economics (1987)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Participation and Development: Perspectives from the Comprehensive Development Paradigm (2002)Utility Functions that Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications (1990)Uncertainty and The Welfare Economics of Medical Care (2001)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving (1973)JOB MARKET SIGNALING **The essay is based on the author's doctoral dissertation (“Market Signalling: The Informational Structure of Job Markets and Related Phenomena,” Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1972), forthcoming as a book entitled Market Signaling: Information Transfer in Hinng and Related Screening Processes in the Harvard Economic Studies Series, Harvard University Press. The aim here is to present the outline of the signaling model and some of its conclusions. Generalizations of the numerical examples used for expositional purposes here are found in ibid, and elsewhere. (1978)Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure (1983)Fostering Parasocial Relationships with Celebrities on Social Media: Implications for Celebrity Endorsement (2017)The Nature of the Firm (1937)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Law and Finance (1998)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead (2000)On Moral Hazard and Insurance (1979)Redistributive taxation as social insurance (1980)A Theory of Wage Dynamics (1982)Incumbent performance and electoral control (1986)The causes of corruption: a cross-national study (2000)Eight Questions about Corruption (2005)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1973The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.4,296 cited
  • 1972Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing.3,991 cited
  • 1974Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers1,845 cited
  • 1979Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information942 cited
  • 1974Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution795 cited
  • 1970Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives595 cited
  • 1969The Economics of Moral Hazard573 cited
  • 1975Incentives, Risk , and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy355 cited

Cited by

  • 1983Optimal Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules276 cited
  • 2008Top management incentive compensation and knowledge sharing in multinational corporations200 cited
  • 2010Empirical evidence on the operational efficiency of National Oil Companies171 cited
  • 1983The Interdependence of Individual Portfolio Decisions and the Demand for Insurance168 cited
  • 2001A reexamination of agency theory assumptions: extensions and extrapolations167 cited
  • 1987

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard
164 cited
  • 1985Redirecting research in business policy and strategy135 cited
  • 2020Does Corporate Governance Affect the Quality of Integrated Reporting?135 cited
  • 1989Salesforce Compensation: Theory and Managerial Implications131 cited
  • 1991The Interaction between Forms of Insurance Contract and Types of Technical Change in Medical Care117 cited
  • 1983Employment With Asymmetric Information114 cited
  • 2000Optimal Insurance under Moral Hazard108 cited
  • 1998Optimism Biases among Brokerage and Non-Brokerage Firms' Equity Recommendations: Agency Costs in the Investment Industry106 cited
  • 2007Effort, Performance, and Conscientiousness: An Agency Theory Perspective104 cited
  • 2017Management Risk Incentives and the Readability of Corporate Disclosures103 cited
  • 2015Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights103 cited