Management control of inter-firm relations: the role of information.

Abstract

Management control of inter-firm relations: the role of information. This dissertation provides three empirical studies on the impact of m ore refined cost and management accounting information on buyer-supplier relations and outcomes. The first two manuscripts are experiment-based and assess to what extent more refined information (operationalized as T otal Cost of Ownership information) can be useful in inter-firm cost man agement between buyers and suppliers in different business settings. Whi le the first manuscript focuses on the use of information in different p ower settings, the second manuscript investigates the influence of infor mation on buyer-supplier negotiations in different inter-firm management control settings. The results of manuscript 1 provide insights into how less powerful buyers use information to signal non-opportunistic behavi or to the other partner in the relationship. Manuscript 1 also demonstra tes that, contrary to what is popularly believed, more refined informati on does not always result in better outcomes. Manuscript 2 examines the way in which trust is built in the relationship (the how of t he trust building process) and the role that information plays in this p rocess. The results of manuscript 2 also contribute to the ongoing discu ssion on the relation between formal controls and trust (i.e. whether th ey are substitutes or complements). Recent studies suggest that the rela tion between information, trust and formal controls may be non-linear. M anuscript 2 provides empirical support for these claims. The third manus cript is survey-based and discusses how information relates to other int er-firm governance mechanisms (trust and formal controls) in inter-firm relations. The central aim of manuscript 3 is to discuss how trust, form al controls and information reduce perceived risk. While previous studie s on the relation between trust and controls typically treated the diffe rent governance mechanisms as uni-dimensional constructs, this study exp licitly models them as multidimensional constructs. By doing so, manuscr ipt 3 reveals that the relation between the different governance mechani sms is far more complex than simply substitutive or complementary. Final ly, a distinction between buyer-supplier relations with and without prio r ties is made and important differences are found between these two gro ups in the effectiveness of the different governance mechanisms in reduc ing perceived risk.

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