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This chapter explains that Aristotle is only committed to a moderate form of hylomorphism, rather than the stronger form advocated by David Charles. On the moderate view, psychological states as a whole are inseparable, both in existence and in thought, from their formal and material components, while the components may be separable in some way from each other and from the state as whole. The strong view adds the claim that these components cannot be separated from one another, especially in thought. But moderate hylomorphism is all that is required to account for the evidence Charles brings forward the contrast between mathematics and natural philosophy, the distinction between determinables and determinates, and Aristotle's example of the snub nose and it is the one we should favor, given that it is the more economical hypothesis and preserves the explanatory power of Aristotle's account. Keywords: Aristotle's psychological theory; David Charles; hylomorphism
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