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Consistency in Rationalist Moral Systems
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Consistency in Rationalist Moral Systems (1984)Consistency in Rationalist Moral Systems“Ought” Implies “Can” but Does Not Imply “Must”: An Asymmetry between Becoming Infeasible and Becoming Overridden (2018)“Ought” Implies “Can” but Doe…Moral Obligations: Actualist, Possibilist, or Hybridist? (2016)Moral Obligations: Actualist,…What Normative Terms Mean and Why It Matters for Ethical Theory (2015)What Normative Terms Mean and…Conflicting reasons, unconflicting ‘ought’s (2015)Conflicting reasons, unconfli…Institutionally Driven Moral Conflicts and Managerial Action: Dirty Hands or Permissible Complicity? (2014)Institutionally Driven Moral …VI-Ought but Cannot (2009)VI-Ought but CannotKantian Normative Ethics (2007)Kantian Normative EthicsReasoning with Moral Conflicts (2003)Reasoning with Moral ConflictsPersonal Values and Setting Oneself Ends (2002)Personal Values and Setting O…Meeting Needs and Doing Favors (2002)Meeting Needs and Doing FavorsFour Conceptions of Conscience (2002)Four Conceptions of ConscienceMust Respect Be Earned? (2000)Must Respect Be Earned?A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules (2000)A Kantian Perspective on Mora…Jephthah's Plight: Moral Dilemmas and Theism (1991)Jephthah's Plight: Moral Dile…A GAMEMNON AND ABRAHAM: THE TRAGIC DILEMMA OF KIERKEGAARD'S KNIGHT OF FAITH (1990)A GAMEMNON AND ABRAHAM: THE T…MORAL PARTICULARITY (1987)MORAL PARTICULARITYReligion within the Limits of Reason Alone: (2017)Grains of Wheat (2025)L'Existentialisme est un humanisme (1947)Moral Dilemmas and Consistency (1980)Existentialism Is a Humanism (2007)COMPARATIVE VALUE AND THE WEIGHT OF REASONS (2018)Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy (2018)Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought (2018)The Complete Works of Aristotle the Revised Oxford Translation (1984)The Concept of Moral Obligation (1996)Willpower: rediscovering the greatest human strength (2012)Actualism Has Control Issues (2016)Subjective versus Objective Moral Wrongness (2021)Modern Moral Philosophy (1958)Moral Luck (1981)The Sources of Normativity (1996)Human Dignity and Tragic Choices (2021)Freedom of Conscience and the Value of Personal Integrity (2016)Civilization and Its Discontents (2018)Critique of Practical Reason. (1949)Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (2020)Groundwork of The Metaphysic of Morals (2020)Two Concepts of Rules (1955)Moral Thinking (1981)The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values (1993)From Self‐Respect to Respect for Others (2012)Beyond Duty (2021)The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories (1976)The Moral Contours of Empathy (2005)Did Kant Hold that Rational Volition is Sub Ratione Boni? (2015)
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  • 2003Reasoning with Moral Conflicts81 cited
  • 2000Must Respect Be Earned?50 cited
  • 2002Meeting Needs and Doing Favors44 cited
  • 1990A GAMEMNON AND ABRAHAM: THE TRAGIC DILEMMA OF KIERKEGAARD'S KNIGHT OF FAITH44 cited
  • 2002Four Conceptions of Conscience41 cited
  • 2002Personal Values and Setting Oneself Ends40 cited
  • 2016Moral Obligations: Actualist, Possibilist, or Hybridist?35 cited
  • 1987MORAL PARTICULARITY33 cited
  • 2007Kantian Normative Ethics30 cited
  • 2000A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules26 cited
  • 2015Conflicting reasons, unconflicting ‘ought’s26 cited
  • 2018“Ought” Implies “Can” but Does Not Imply “Must”: An Asymmetry between Becoming Infeasible and Becoming Overridden24 cited
  • 2009VI-Ought but Cannot24 cited
  • 2015What Normative Terms Mean and Why It Matters for Ethical Theory19 cited
  • 2014Institutionally Driven Moral Conflicts and Managerial Action: Dirty Hands or Permissible Complicity?7 cited
  • 1991Jephthah's Plight: Moral Dilemmas and Theism

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5 cited