Kant on the Material Ground of Possibility: From "The Only Possible Argument" to the "Critique of Pure Reason"

Abstract

KANT ARGUES AT GREAT LENGTH in the Critique of Pure Reason that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated by means of theoretical reason. For after dividing all traditional theistic proofs into three different kinds--the ontological, the cosmological, and the physicotheological(1)--Kant argues first that the cosmological and physicotheological implicitly assume the ontological argument and then that the ontological argument is necessarily fallacious. By restricting knowledge in this manner Kant notoriously makes room for faith, that is, in this case, for a practical proof of the existence of God, which he develops in the Critique of Practical Reason. Kant's reasons for rejecting theoretical proofs(2) of the existence of God have received considerable attention. In particular, Kant's objection to the ontological argument, namely that existence is not a real predicate, still seems relevant in contemporary philosophy of religion.(3) What has not received much attention, however, is the relationship between Kant's rejection of theistic proofs in his period (that is, starting with the publication of the first Critique in 1781) and his views on the matter in his pre-critical period. For throughout his pre-critical period, but especially in his The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the of God (1763), Kant believes that there is a theoretical proof of the existence of God. One would naturally expect Kant's criticisms of theistic proofs as developed in the of pure (that is, the third chapter of the first Critique's transcendental dialectic) to apply in straightforward ways to his earlier attempts at a theistic proof. However, Kant rejects the three traditional arguments in The Only Possible Argument just as he does in the first Critique. Further, his reason for rejecting the ontological argument in particular is identical to the one presented in the first Critique: Existence is not a predicate or a determination of a thing.(2) Accordingly, Kant understood himself to be developing a theistic proof in The Only Possible Argument that is distinct from the three traditional arguments and is also not subject to the objections he raises against them. Given that Kant rejects all theoretical proofs of God's existence in his period and given that he did not take his objections to the traditional proofs to apply to the theistic proof developed in The Only Possible Argument, what is his justification for rejecting his pre-critical argument for God's existence?(3) In this paper, after first reconstructing in some detail Kant's precritical theistic proof as it is developed in The Only Possible Argument (1), we shall argue that standard answers to this question, which focus on general features of either transcendental idealism or the critical turn, are inadequate (2). Instead, we maintain that an examination of several passages from the ideal of pure reason is crucial to discerning Kant's subtle position (3). For it reveals that Kant continues to endorse his pre-critical argument, though he weakens its conclusion by positing God as merely a regulative rather than a constitutive principle. By weakening the status of the argument's conclusion in this manner Kant hopes to avoid any conflict with his general claim that the existence of God cannot be proved while still being able to invoke God in certain epistemic contexts. However, the fact that Kant modifies his position in this delicate way does not obviate the original question. For it is still appropriate to ask what Kant's justification is for rejecting the original (or full-strength) conclusion of his pre-critical theistic argument. That is, why does Kant's argument not establish God's existence as a constitutive principle? Although it is tempting to think that Kant could apply his general strategy in the dialectic (as found, for example, in his resolution to the antinomies) to this theological context, we shall suggest that Kant's change of position is ultimately based on, and thus stands or falls with, his unique analysis of reason and the understanding. …

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