A Laboratory Assessment of Tradable Fishing Allowances

Abstract

Transferable allowance management systems are receiving increased attention from fishery managers and stakeholders alike. We use a laboratory experiment in which human subjects play the role of fishers to evaluate the promised economic efficiency of tradable allowance systems. In an experiment designed to parallel the most common rules for trading allowances, we find that allowance prices are only weakly associated with the value of the fishing right it provides. Instead, we find a high degree of price variability, consistent with field experiences. In the lab, this variability hampers convergence and supports speculation, leading to average prices much higher than the equilibrium value of allowances. During this protracted price discovery, allowances are misallocated and efficiency falls. Modifications to the market institutions used in most tradable allowance systems to improve price discovery and enhance efficiency are discussed.

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