Articlebronze2018

CEO Monitoring and Board Effectiveness: Resolving the CEO Compensation Issue

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Corporate Finance and Governance Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Corporate Governance and Financial Management

Abstract

This study examines the impact of board governance mechanisms on the pay of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) using a sample of major French listed companies for the 2009–2011 period. The results show that CEO pay is negatively associated with the presence of a family CEO and positively associated with board size, busy directors, board meetings, and compensation committee independence. We provide further evidence that CEO compensation increases with firm size, and both present and past performance. Our study casts doubt on the effectiveness of formal board attributes in constraining CEO compensation.

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References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1983Separation of Ownership and Control 1997A Survey of Corporate Governance 1999Corporate Ownership Around the World 1993The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems 1996Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors 1999Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance 2002The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations

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