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Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does not Know Endowments or Production Sets

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References

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1977Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem823 cited
2022The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation593 cited
1988Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation136 cited
1979On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria135 cited
1979Manipulation via Endowments130 cited

Cited by

2012Implementation with evidence85 cited
2002The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects79 cited
1997Non-cooperative implementation of the core78 cited
1999A Voluntary Participation Game with a Non-excludable Public Good74 cited
1997Approximately Competitive Equilibria in Large Finite Economies58 cited

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