References

• 1961Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms7,892 cited
• 1989Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior4,063 cited
• 2004Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity2,510 cited
• 1989Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity2,308 cited
• 1987Expected utility with purely subjective non-additive probabilities818 cited
• 1989Dynamic Consistency and Non-expected Utility Models of Choice under Uncertainty782 cited
• 1986Maxmin Expected Utility with a Non-Unique Prior668 cited
• 1992A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability585 cited
• 1993Updating Ambiguous Beliefs419 cited
• 1990Two-Stage Lotteries without the Reduction Axiom384 cited
• 1988Consequentialist foundations for expected utility368 cited
• 1989Linear utility theory for belief functions252 cited
• 1993Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian222 cited
• 2001Coping with ignorance: unforeseen contingencies and non-additive uncertainty147 cited
• 1988Nonexpected utility as aversion of information113 cited
• 1993Decision making with belief functions: Compatibility and incompatibility with the sure-thing principle