A Deliberative Theory of Interest Representation

Abstract

In this chapter, the author argues that interest groups contribute to deliberative processes by bringing to bear additional information and new perspectives— thus by changing preferences rather than simply by exerting pressure or adding a new force to the search for an equilibrium among interests. She looks first at how the deliberative function of interest groups fits into a normative theory of democracy, then at three ways empirical political scientists have recently described that deliberative function and finally, at suggestions for reform of the system by which we represent interests. The author also argues that these suggestions follow the implicit maxim "Maximize deliberative benefits; minimize rent-seeking costs. Deliberation is a dynamic process, often requiring a change in preferences. n general, polities whose members expect interests to conflict on most issues do not invest much time or effort in deliberation, preferring to shorten their investment in talk and thought by proceeding directly to a vote that produces an authoritative decision.

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