Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution

Abstract

If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the tree at last brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last reveal what they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the sovereign individual , like only to himself, liberated again from the morality of custom, autonomous and supramoral. Nietzsche Taking the Law into Our Own Hands Morality is unconditional and overriding. Its demands are uncompromising and its claims take priority over all others. Yet we can all think of situations in which, for reasons that seem to us honorable, unselfish, or conscientious, we would do things which morality seems to forbid. I want to ask how we can account for this fact. There are two attempts to deal with the problem which, for obvious reasons, I will call skepticism and dogmatism. The skeptic denies that morality is unconditional and overriding. The dogmatist insists that it is, and argues that either the actions in question are not wrong, or, if they are, a good person just won't do them. Some skeptics and dogmatists are merely trying to domesticate the phenomena. The skeptic may have pretensions to being worldly and realistic, laughing at the ponderous claims of moralists. The dogmatist may simply be a moralistic prig. But there are serious and attractive versions of both views. The skeptic may think, as Bernard Williams does, that a life in which moral considerations can always override love and the cherished projects of a lifetime is not recognizably human.

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