Error theory and reasons for belief

Abstract

This chapter outlines the alleged structural similarities between moral reasons and epistemic reasons and gives a more precise characterization of epistemic error theory. It distinguishes between transcendent norms, which imply categorical reasons, and immanent norms, which do not imply categorical reasons. The chapter explores the question of what error theorists should say about reasons for belief. It examines what Terence Cuneo claims to be three undesirable results of epistemic error theory, namely that epistemic error theory is self-defeating or polemically toothless, that epistemic error theory implies that there can be no arguments for anything, and that epistemic error theory rules out the possibility of epistemic merits and demerits. The chapter argues that for the purpose of distinguishing belief from other kinds of attitudes the norms involved in belief ascriptions need not be understood as transcendent rather than immanent and consequently there are no worrisome implications for epistemic error theory.

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