The Neoclassical Maximization Hypothesis: Reply

Abstract

Bruce Caldwell has chided me for ignoring the contributions of modem philosophers in my 1981 article. Supposedly, if I were to appreciate the contributions of the logical empiricists since the mid-1930's I would see the error of my ways. Caldwell chooses to focus on my view of criticism-namely, that for any criticism to be successful it must be decisive, or as he says, compelling. He feels this concept is overly narrow.' I understand him to be saying that there are other concepts which are less narrow and thus my concept is only a special case. He recommends a more liberal concept of criticism which he calls appraisal. My reply is that he is exactly wrong. The idea that criticism must be logically compelling is not narrow but, instead, the broadest possible. And worse, his concept of criticism is completely inadequate. The implication that we should avoid logically compelling criticism in favor of a weaker line of argument (which he calls appraisal) is merely an expression of Caldwell's advocacy of the commonly promoted, but logically inadequate, methodology which philosophers today call conventionalism.

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