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Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
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Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2015)Obviously Strategy-Proof MechanismsSubject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE (2015)Subject pool recruitment proc…5 Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study (2009)5 Information Impact and Allo…z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments (2007)z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for re…Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study (2007)Unraveling in Guessing Games:…Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets (2007)Repugnance as a Constraint on…An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects (2004)An Efficient Ascending-Bid Au…Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games (1995)Quantal Response Equilibria f…On Players′ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence (1995)On Players′ Models of Other P…Experimental evidence on players' models of other players (1994)Experimental evidence on play…Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders (1993)Independent Private Value Auc…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignGroves' Scheme on Restricted Domains (1979)Groves' Scheme on Restricted …Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods (1977)Characterization of Satisfact…On cores and indivisibility (1974)On cores and indivisibilityCompetitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution (1974)Competitive and optimal respo…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS,…The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving (1973)JOB MARKET SIGNALING **The essay is based on the author's doctoral dissertation (“Market Signalling: The Informational Structure of Job Markets and Related Phenomena,” Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1972), forthcoming as a book entitled Market Signaling: Information Transfer in Hinng and Related Screening Processes in the Harvard Economic Studies Series, Harvard University Press. The aim here is to present the outline of the signaling model and some of its conclusions. Generalizations of the numerical examples used for expositional purposes here are found in ibid, and elsewhere. (1978)Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure (1983)Fostering Parasocial Relationships with Celebrities on Social Media: Implications for Celebrity Endorsement (2017)Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Incentives in Teams (1973)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Incentives and incomplete information (1979)Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract) (1999)Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term (1995)From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens (2000)Privacy and rationality in individual decision making (2005)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)The assignment game I: The core (1971)A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem (2001)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)The Boston Public School Match (2005)Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study (2001)Behavioral Game Theory (2004)A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment (2001)Altruistic punishment in humans (2002)Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much? (2007)A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation (1998)Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria (1998)A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation (1999)Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie (2016)Preferences for Truth-Telling (2016)
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References

  • 2007z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments9,517 cited
  • 1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS7,719 cited
  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 1995Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games2,553 cited
  • 2015Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE2,285 cited
  • 2007Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study1,395 cited
  • 1974On cores and indivisibility1,254 cited
  • 1995On Players′ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence1,133 cited
  • 1977Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods803 cited
  • 1974Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution795 cited
  • 2004An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects727 cited
  • 1994Experimental evidence on players' models of other players683 cited
  • 2007Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets580 cited
  • 1993Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders474 cited
  • 20095 Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study

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458 cited
  • 1979Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains413 cited
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