Seman tic Accounts of Vagueness

Abstract

Abstract Crispin Wright’s reflections on vagueness have, for nearly thirty years now, been a. touchstone for all serious work on it. His most recent efforts, beginning with the paper ‘On Being in a Quandary’ and continued in this volume, seem to me extremely important. What I want to do here, however, is not to try to evaluate his new: position, nor even to engage it directly, but instead to defend one of the more traditional views he criticizes, namely, the view that vagueness is a ‘semantic’ phenomenon. I am not at all sure this sort of view is right, but I think we need a better sense than we presently have of what might be wrong with it if we are to discover a better view. I will begin, however, by discussing another question that has obviously exercised Wright a great deal, namely, what is really wrong with Epistemicism and other views that are committed to the retention of bivalence even for vague predicates.

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