Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States

Paul M. Churchland

589 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Philosophy

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Abstract

En discutant les arguments recents d'anti-reductionnistes en psychologie, l'A. montre que les approches materialistes et reductionnistes des neurosciences ne sont pas necessairement une menace pour une approche phenomenologique des traits qualitatifs des sensations. L'A. s'attache a l'exemple de la conscience subjective, telle qu'elle peut s'exprimer dans l'introspection. Il discute tout particulierement des arguments de T. Nagel, What is it like to be a bat? (Philosophical Review LXXXIII, 4, 1974, p. 435-450) dont il donne une analyse et une refutation minutieuses.

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