Mimesis and Genre Theory in Aristotle's Poetics

Abstract

ion by which only a limited number of features of the reappear. Hence, thirdly, the pleasure is in the (re?)construction of the by means of signs, reversed by a detour via the recipient. This argument supports the view that the realism debate is irrelevant: if mimetic reception is a (re?)construction by the recipient of the semiosized model, the difference between figurative and nonfigurative art is negligible as far as the relation of art to reality is concerned, for in the case of an emergency, the receiver just makes up a model if no existing one is available. I must admit that a few lines further on Aristotle seems to contradict himself when he argues that the pleasure is different if we do not recognize or know the model. Even then, however, two aspects of the same event are concerned, and in principle the difference is only relative. In both cases, though perhaps in different proportions, the pleasure of fre)connaissance and the pleasure caused by the form, the more specific aesthetic sign, or, in Lacanian terms, since we know that the signifier founds the signified, the difference between both aspects has lost its relevance. From the activity of the recipient thus formulated, it is only one step to the psychoanalytically important notion of katharsis. It is impossible to do justice to this concept so often discussed (for an example, see Verhoeff 1981) in the context of mimesis; what interests me here is the extension of the activity of reception it enhances. Katharsis is an aspect of mimesis in its effect on the recipient, which closes the circuit of the different but coexistent objects of mimesis. This influence, by a sort of psychoanalytical transfer of the katharsis onto the recipient, thus completes the relation between reality and art: reality-representation-reality (katharsis effectuated) 1 I 1 copy of copy of copy-new for recipient DL deconstruct the concept of katharsis into three isotopes. The first one is in the context of a dialogue with Plato. For moral reasons, Plato was against mimesis because it was supposed to contaminate the recipient. Aristotle's notion of katharsis forms a binary opposition with this moral notion of contamination, and hence it can be located within the same moral isotope. The second isotope is in the psychoanalytical context. Aristotle names two disturbing emotions, phobos and eleos, fear and pity. These two emotions specify the possible emotive reactions of the recipient, according to the direction of identification. Fear is based on direct identification, while pity is based on a general feeling of justice that makes us feel sorrow if someone else is sufferingu'njustly. The common feature is malaise. This feature is in opposition to the aforementioned pleasure (hedone) of representation, which was merely a cognitive pleasure. The cognitive is thus opposed to the emotional, while the good (pleasure) is opposed to the bad (malaise). These four features cross in katharsis: the purification of (unconscious) bad feelings clears the way for the (conscious) knowing of good feelings, a process that elevates the cognitive to a higher level by the effect This content downloaded from 207.46.13.51 on Sun, 19 Jun 2016 06:09:41 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

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