Budgeted social choice: from consensus to personalized decision making

Abstract

We develop a general framework for social choice problems in which a limited number of alternatives can be recommended to an agent population. In our budgeted social choice model, this limit is determined by a budget, capturing problems that arise naturally in a variety of contexts, and spanning the continuum from pure consensus decision making (i.e., standard social choice) to fully personalized recommendation. Our approach applies a form of segmentation to social choice problems— requiring the selection of diverse options tailored to different agent types—and generalizes certain multi-winner election schemes. We show that standard rank aggregation methods perform poorly, and that optimization in our model is NP-complete; but we develop fast greedy algorithms with some theoretical guarantees. Experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms.

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