THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF BELIEF AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DEGREES OF BELIEF

Richard Foley

222 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Philosophical Quarterly

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

V-xONSIDER two questions. What propo? sitions are epistemically rational for us to be? lieve? And, with what confidence is it epistemically rational for us to believe a proposition? Answering the first of these questions re? quires an epistemology of belief, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of be? lief. The two kinds of accounts would seem to be close cousins, the problems they encoun? ter and the range of options for solving them being essentially the same. An account of ra? tional degrees of belief simply adopts a more fine-grained approach to doxastic attitudes than does an account of rational beliefs. The

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2010What Else Justification Could Be1 2020The relationship between belief and credence 2018Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters 2019Knowing Our Limits 1999The preface, the lottery, and the logic of belief 2015Accuracy and the credence-belief connection 2008Assertion, Moore, and Bayes 2019Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain

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