Trust, Owner Rights, Employee Rights and Firm Performance

Abstract

Abstract This is a study of variations in trust relationships according to institutional setting. A wide body of comparative institutional literature within economics and finance engages with trust. However, as most of this literature uses macro‐level data and/or stylistic ideal types, it normally neglects intra‐firm trust. This paper redresses this lacuna by using both macro‐level data and comparative firm‐level evidence. We found that both country trust and firm trust increase firm performance, but that there is a trade‐off between the two as high levels of both reduce performance. Finally, both employee rights and investor rights are negatively correlated with country trust.

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