The Liberal Government of Unfreedom

Abstract

Perhaps the most influential aspect of Michel Foucault's work on government has been his treatment of liberalism as distinctive form of political reason. Liberalism is commonly regarded as normative political doctrine or theory that treats the maintenance of individual liberty as an end in itself and therefore views liberty as setting limits of principle both to the legitimate objectives of government and to the manner in which those objectives may be pursued. Foucault's account of liberalism as rationality of government also accords central place to individual liberty, which is seen as giving rise to prudential concern that one might be governing too much. The suggestion is that, rather than pursue its objectives through the detailed regulation of conduct in the manner of police, it might be more effective for the government of state to work through the maintenance and promotion of certain forms of individual liberty. According to this account, underlying the liberal fear of governing too much are two distinct but related perceptions of the population to be governed. It is seen first as containing number of self-regulating domains of social interaction, and secondly as consisting of individuals endowed with capacity for autonomous, self-directing activity. In liberal political thought, Foucault observes, the market epitomizes both perceptions, serving, in effect, as a locus of privileged experience where one can identify the effects of excessive governmentality.1 Liberal political reason, then, sees individual liberty as limit, not simply to the legitimate reach of government, but also to its effectiveness. More recent scholars have adapted this account of liberalism to the analysis of neoliberal attempts to govern through the decisions of autonomous individuals.

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