Being Realistic about Reasons

Т. М. Scanlon

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Free Will and Agency

Abstract

Is what we have reason to do a matter of fact? If so, what kind of truth is involved, how can we know it, and how do reasons motivate and explain action? In this concise and lucid book T.M. Scanlon offers answers, with a qualified defence of normative cognitivism - the view that there are normative truths about reasons for action.

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2017There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes 2014The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism 2015Real Definition 2012Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive 2016The Unity of Grounding 2018Human Dignity and Human Rights 2018The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles 2016The Value-Based Theory of Reasons

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