In defense of eliminative materialism

Abstract

An this brief note, I should like to comment on two replies to my Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories x?one by James Cornman 2 and the other by Richard Bernstein.3 I shall concentrate upon a single point which is made by both critics. In my article, I attempted to work out an analogy between talking about demons and talking about sensations, urging that sensation-discourse might go the way of demon-discourse, given the proper neurological discoveries and resulting neurological ways of explaining behavior. More specifically, I argued that sensa tion might lose its reporting role as well as its explanatory role, just as demon had lost both its roles, and that both of these roles might be takt.a over by reference to brain-processes. In response to this strategy, Cornman argues that

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