Chapter2013

Value and Reasons to Favour1

50 citations0/0 files storedOxford University Press eBooks

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art

Abstract

This paper defends a 'fitting attitudes' view of value on which what it is for something to be good is for there to be reasons to favour that thing. The first section of the paper defends a 'linking principle' connecting reasons and value. The second and third sections argue that this principle is better explained by a fitting-attitudes view than by 'value-first' views on which reasons are explained in terms of value.

Citations in this library

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References

198611. Reasons and Persons 2000What We Owe to Each Other 2004Ethics Without Principles 1994The Moral Problem 2010Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction 2011On What Matters 2004The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value 2001Virtue, Vice, and Value

Cited by

2014A FAULT LINE IN ETHICAL THEORY 2015Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness 2021Are epistemic reasons normative?2014VIII-Fitting Belief

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