Do we need a mechanism for solving sovereign debt crises? A rule-based discussion

Ugo G. Panizza

16 citations0/0 files storedRePEc: Research Papers in Economics

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Global Financial Crisis and Policies Corporate Insolvency and Governance Global Financial Regulation and Crises

Abstract

This paper uses the rules of engineering as a rhetorical device to discuss why the international financial architecture needs a structured mechanism for dealing with sovereign insolvency. The paper suggests that the most important problem with the status-quo relates to delayed defaults and sketches a proposal aimed at mitigating this problem.

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References

1988Financing vs. forgiving a debt overhang 2013Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions 2009The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default 1985Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation 2009The Costs of Sovereign Default 2010The elusive costs of sovereign defaults 2002A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring 2002Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001

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