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Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory
13 references·10 citing·43 second hop
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this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1994A Course in Game Theory5,468 cited
  • 1970Convention: A Philosophical Study.3,121 cited
  • 1993Global Games and Equilibrium Selection1,547 cited
  • 1962Knowledge and belief1,535 cited
  • 1981Definite reference and mutual knowledge1,445 cited
  • 1992The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge”523 cited
  • 1995The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory505 cited
  • 1989Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs459 cited
  • 1997The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information297 cited
  • 1995p-Dominance and Belief Potential226 cited
  • 2008Rationality and knowledge in game theory124 cited
  • 2016Three Views of Common Knowledge114 cited
  • 1993Logical Structure of Common Knowledge90 cited

Cited by

  • 2016Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics72 cited
  • 1996How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?63 cited
  • 2005Non-cooperative computation: Boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity59 cited

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  • 1999Common knowledge revisited45 cited
  • 2020Best practices in replication: a case study of common information in coordination games26 cited
  • 2010Being realistic about common knowledge: a Lewisian approach26 cited
  • 2016The Fragility of Common Knowledge25 cited
  • 2013Game Theory Models in Finance24 cited
  • 1998Finance Applications of Game Theory23 cited
  • 2001Competition for Order Flow as a Coordination Game21 cited