Representing and Reasoning with Preferences

Toby Walsh

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization

Abstract

I consider how to represent and reason with users' preferences. While areas of economics like social choice and game theory have traditionally considered such topics, I will argue that computer science and artificial intelligence bring some fresh perspectives to the study of representing and reasoning with preferences. For instance, I consider how we can elicit preferences efficiently and effectively.

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1951Social Choice and Individual Values.1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions 1989Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election 1989The computational difficulty of manipulating an election 1991Single transferable vote resists strategic voting 2007When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?2005Voting procedures with incomplete preferences

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