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Representing and Reasoning with Preferences
16 references·0 citing·30 second hop
Representing and Reasoning with Preferences (2007)Representing and Reasoning with Preferenc…Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate (2018)Nonexistence of Voting Rules …When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? (2007)When are elections with few c…Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation (2007)Uncertainty in preference eli…Junta Distributions and the Average-Case Complexity of Manipulating Elections (2007)Junta Distributions and the A…Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation (2007)Incompleteness and incomparab…Voting procedures with incomplete preferences (2005)Voting procedures with incomp…Hybrid Voting Protocols and Hardness of Manipulation (2005)Hybrid Voting Protocols and H…Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard (2003)Universal Voting Protocol Twe…A Problem with Referendums (2000)A Problem with ReferendumsThe paradox of multiple elections (1998)The paradox of multiple elect…Single transferable vote resists strategic voting (1991)Single transferable vote resi…Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election (1989)Voting schemes for which it c…The computational difficulty of manipulating an election (1989)The computational difficulty …Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness and Arrow'…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Manipulation of Voting Scheme…Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Social Choice and Individual …Chapter 4 Voting procedures (2002)The complexity of Kemeny elections (2005)Computational Social Choice (2012)Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting (2015)Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1997)How Hard Is Bribery in Elections? (2009)Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control (2009)AI's War on Manipulation: Are We Winning? (2010)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (1982)Political Institutions (2001)Strategy-proof judgement aggregation (2007)Condorcet Social Choice Functions (1977)Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem (2001)Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation (2002)Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (2014)Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules (1960)Stability in Voting (1961)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice (2007)Considerations on Representative Government (2010)Dichotomy for voting systems (2006)Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem (2008)Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries (2009)How hard is it to control an election? (1992)A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? (1991)Well-being : the foundations of hedonic psychology (1999)What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research? (2002)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)
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References

  • 1951Social Choice and Individual Values.7,819 cited
  • 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,247 cited
  • 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,837 cited
  • 1989Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election548 cited
  • 1989The computational difficulty of manipulating an election530 cited
  • 1991Single transferable vote resists strategic voting394 cited
  • 2007When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?348 cited
  • 2005Voting procedures with incomplete preferences165 cited
  • 1998The paradox of multiple elections162 cited
  • 2007Junta Distributions and the Average-Case Complexity of Manipulating Elections148 cited
  • 2007Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation139 cited
  • 2000A Problem with Referendums139 cited
  • 2018Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate128 cited
  • 2003Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard114 cited
  • 2005Hybrid Voting Protocols and Hardness of Manipulation99 cited

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2007
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation
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