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Is Ignorance Bliss?
6 references·16 citing·46 second hop
Is Ignorance Bliss? (2008)Is Ignorance Bliss?Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior (2010)Maxmin expected utility with …Game theory, maximum entropy, minimum discrepancy and robust Bayesian decision theory (2004)Game theory, maximum entropy,…The Demons of Decision (1987)The Demons of DecisionSocial Choice Theory: A Re-Examination (1977)Social Choice Theory: A Re-Ex…On Indeterminate Probabilities (1974)On Indeterminate ProbabilitiesOn the Principle of Total Evidence (1967)On the Principle of Total Evi…All rationality is bounded (2026)All rationality is boundedPreference for Knowledge (2023)Preference for KnowledgeOn the Normative Status of Mixed Strategies (2022)On the Normative Status of Mi…Rational Polarization (2021)Rational PolarizationHomo Ignorans: Deliberately Choosing Not to Know (2021)Homo Ignorans: Deliberately C…Deference Done Better (2021)Deference Done BetterThe Value of Biased Information (2020)The Value of Biased Informati…Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal (2020)Dynamic consistency and ambig…He Says, She Says: Spousal Disagreement in Survey Measures of Bargaining Power (2019)He Says, She Says: Spousal Di…Dynamic Decision Theory (2018)Dynamic Decision TheoryThe Probabilistic Foundations of Rational Learning (2017)The Probabilistic Foundations…Dilation, Disintegrations, and Delayed Decisions (2015)Dilation, Disintegrations, an…Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist (2015)Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Val…The sure thing principle, dilations, and objective probabilities (2013)The sure thing principle, dil…Dynamic Consistency and Ambiguity: A Reappraisal (2013)Dynamic Consistency and Ambig…Sequential decision making with adaptive utility (2008)Sequential decision making wi…Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele (1928)Rational Decisions (1952)On a Measure of the Information Provided by an Experiment (1956)A Contrast Between two Decision Rules for use with (Convex) Sets of Probabilities: Γ-Maximin Versus E-Admissibilty (2004)Ambiguity and robust statistics (2013)MEASURING DISTRIBUTION MODEL RISK (2013)The Bargaining Problem (1950)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice (1977)Poverty and Famines (1983)Human Development in Poor Countries: On the Role of Private Incomes and Public Services (1993)Anarchy, State, and Utopia (2018)The Logic of Decision (1965)Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization (1973)Discussion: A Mistake in Dynamic Coherence Arguments? (1993)Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent (1999)Distorted Reflection (2009)A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE (1955)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Exploring by Believing (2021)Rational Household Labor Supply (1988)Collective Labor Supply and Welfare (1992)Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old-Age Pensions and Intrahousehold Allocation in South Africa (2003)Ask me why: Patterns of intrahousehold decision-making (2019)Understanding rural household behavior: Beyond Boserup and Becker (2019)Measuring Violence against Women with Experimental Methods (2021)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1974)The case for motivated reasoning. (1990)Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks (2001)From Belief Polarization to Echo Chambers: A Rationalizing Account (2022)Idealization in Epistemology (2023)The Grounds of Political Legitimacy (2023)Applied Statistical Decision Theory (1962)Applied Statistical Decision Theory. (1962)Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation (2013)Discovering Patterns: On the Norms of Mechanistic Inquiry (2019)A ‘soft’ measure of consensus in the setting of partial (fuzzy) preferences (1988)What Conditional Probability Could Not Be (2003)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief (2012)Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability (1967)Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences (2009)Publication bias and the canonization of false facts (2016)Robust Permanent Income and Pricing (1999)How Much Do Investors Care About Macroeconomic Risk? Evidence from Scheduled Economic Announcements (2013)Frameworks and Results in Distributionally Robust Optimization (2022)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1977Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination692 cited
  • 1974On Indeterminate Probabilities547 cited
  • 2010Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior484 cited
  • 2004Game theory, maximum entropy, minimum discrepancy and robust Bayesian decision theory455 cited
  • 1967On the Principle of Total Evidence329 cited
  • 1987The Demons of Decision66 cited

Cited by

  • 2021Rational Polarization108 cited
  • 2019He Says, She Says: Spousal Disagreement in Survey Measures of Bargaining Power103 cited
  • 2017The Probabilistic Foundations of Rational Learning51 cited
  • 2015Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist47 cited
  • 2020The Value of Biased Information33 cited
  • 2021Deference Done Better26 cited
  • 2021Homo Ignorans: Deliberately Choosing Not to Know26 cited
  • 2020Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal15 cited
  • 2015Dilation, Disintegrations, and Delayed Decisions13 cited
  • 2013Dynamic Consistency and Ambiguity: A Reappraisal8 cited

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  • 2008Sequential decision making with adaptive utility7 cited
  • 2013The sure thing principle, dilations, and objective probabilities5 cited
  • 2018Dynamic Decision Theory3 cited
  • 2022On the Normative Status of Mixed Strategies2 cited
  • 2026All rationality is bounded1 cited
  • 2023Preference for Knowledge1 cited