Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability

Ian Hacking

354 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy of Science

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Probability and Statistical Research Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

A person required to risk money on a remote digit of π would, in order to comply fully with the theory [of personal probability] have to compute that digit, though this would really be wasteful if the cost of computation were more than the prize involved. For the postulates of the theory imply that you should behave in accordance with the logical implications of all that you know. Is it possible to improve the theory in this respect, making allowance within it for the cost of thinking, or would that entail paradox?

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References

1962Knowledge and belief 1895WHAT THE TORTOISE SAID TO ACHILLES 1965The Logic of Decision 1947Meaning and Necessity 2016Logic of Statistical Inference 2018What the Tortoise Said to Achilles 1967On the Principle of Total Evidence 1955Coherence and the axioms of confirmation

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2005Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New Order 2015Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities*2005Symmetry and its Discontents 1987Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics 1970Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief 1976Conditionalization, Observation, and Change of Preference 2016Dutch Book Arguments 1980

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